Affirmative action in a competitive economy

被引:45
作者
Moro, A
Norman, P
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Dept Econ, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
affirmative action; statistical discrimination; general equilibrium; asymmetric information; human capital;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00121-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages. Discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium in the presence of two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of workers. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may 'fail' in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently. However, the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy. The welfare effects are ambiguous. It is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off: even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:567 / 594
页数:28
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