Commitment and the adoption of a common currency

被引:12
作者
Cooper, R
Kempf, H
机构
[1] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[2] Univ Paris 01, F-75231 Paris 05, France
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00064
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto-dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 142
页数:24
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