A test of whether negative emotional priming facilitates access to latent dysfunctional attitudes

The mood-state hypothesis (Persons & Miranda, 1992) proposes that dysfunctional beliefs are stable in nature but that reporting such beliefs depends on current mood state. It further proposes that access to latent dysfunctional beliefs gained through negative emotional priming will augment the prediction of depressed mood reactions. To test these ideas, recovered-depressed (RD) and never-depressed (ND) college students were assigned to one of three mood-induction conditions: positive induction, negative induction, no induction. Dysfunctional beliefs were assessed in each condition. Approximately one week later, subjects returned for a second session in which they imagined themselves in various situations and rated how depressed or happy each situation would make them feel. Results were contrary to the mood-state hypothesis. That is, the mood induction did not differentially facilitate access to dysfunctional attitudes, nor were mood-induced dysfunctional attitudes differentially predictive of depressed mood reactions. Instead, consistent with Beck's original diathesis-stress model, dysfunctional attitudes were directly predictive of depressed mood reactions to negative, but not positive, imagined events. Overall, these findings suggest caution in attempts to use negative emotional priming to enhance the prediction of depressed mood reactions.