Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

被引：395

作者：

Taylor, C

Fudenberg, D

Sasaki, A

Nowak, MA

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Math, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Kyushu Univ, Dept Biol, Fac Sci, Fukuoka 8128581, Japan

[4] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Program Evolut Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

BULLETIN OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY | 2004年 / 66卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior. (C) 2004 Society for Mathematical Biology. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1621 / 1644

页数：24

共 26 条

[1]

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