Spontaneous interethnic order: The emergence of collective, path-dependent cooperation

Can "spontaneous," decentralized interethnic cooperation emerge among ethnic groups whose members heavily discount future interethnic relations and do not fear punishment for interethnic noncooperation? Why is it that once the interaction between two ethnic groups evolves along a certain (cooperative or conflictual) path it sometimes becomes harder for the interacting groups to reverse course and seek alternative paths! The answer to these two questions lies in the fact that individual members not only are always calculative and could hence act opportunistically, but also are interdependent and can learn from one another. Because the members of interacting groups operate interdependently they thereby create collective nonlinear path dependence. Using a social game (within evolutionary game theory) the article shows counterintuitively that the emergence of collective, nonlinear path dependence within and across ethnic groups whose members heavily discount the future and face no punishment for interethnic noncooperation makes "spontaneous" decentralized interethnic cooperation a long-run equilibrium. Collective cooperation can thus develop path-dependently among ethnic groups without a Damocles' sword of any sort hanging over their members' heads, even when most individuals are shortsighted and opportunistic.