Emergence, not supervenience

被引：64

作者：

Humphreys, P ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Virginia, Dept Philosophy, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 1997年 / 64卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/392612

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.

引用

页码：S337 / S345

页数：9

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