Is there an insider advantage in getting tenure?

被引：14

作者：

Oyer, Paul ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2007年 / 97卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.97.2.501

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：501 / 505

页数：5

共 9 条

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].

AKERLOF, GA .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) :488-500

[2] External recruitment versus internal promotion [J].

Chan, W .

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1996, 14 (04) :555-570

[3] ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE LABOR-MARKET [J].

GREENWALD, BC .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1986, 53 (03) :325-347

[4] RANKINGS OF ACADEMIC JOURNALS AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS [J].

Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis ;

Stengos, Thanasis ;

Mamuneas, Theofanis P. .

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2003, 1 (06) :1346-1366

[5] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J].

LAZEAR, EP ;

ROSEN, S .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) :841-864

[6] AN ECONOMIC-APPROACH TO INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN ORGANIZATIONS [J].

MILGROM, P ;

ROBERTS, J .

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1988, 94 :S154-S179

[7]

OYER P, J JAPANESE INT EC

[8] Initial labor market conditions and long-term outcomes for economists [J].

Oyer, Paul .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2006, 20 (03) :143-160

[9] Ex ante versus ex post optimal promotion rules: The case of internal promotion [J].

Waldman, M .

ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2003, 41 (01) :27-41

← 1 →