Why are small firms different? Managers' views

被引:20
作者
Agell, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Univ, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
firm-size effect; motivation; relative pay; field survey; matched data;
D O I
10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00371.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
Do incentives differ between large and small organizations? Results from a representative survey of compensation managers are used to shed light on the issues. I find that (i) small establishments rely less on pecuniary incentives, and have a significantly more hostile attitude towards incentive schemes based on competition and relative rewards; (ii) large units are more vulnerable to mechanisms of efficiency wages, effects that remain even after controlling for differences in monitoring ability; (iii) large units are more prone to indicate that negative reciprocity is important, and that their employees care about relative pay. I argue that these findings fit with behavioral stories of incentives and motivation, in particular those stressing group interaction effects, inequity aversion and gift exchange.
引用
收藏
页码:437 / 452
页数:16
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