Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism

被引：172

作者：

Ba, SL ^{[1
]}

Whinston, AB

Zhang, H

机构：

[1] Univ So Calif, Dept Informat & Operat Management, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

[2] Univ Texas, Red McCombs Sch Business, Dept Management Sci & Informat Syst, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[3] Georgia Inst Technol, DuPree Coll Management, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA

来源：

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS | 2003年 / 35卷 / 03期

关键词：

electronic commerce; electronic markets; online auction; trusted third party; certification authority; digital certificate; trust; game theory;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-9236(02)00074-X

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. Using a game theoretic approach, we propose a design of an economic incentive mechanism, the trusted third party (TTP), to serve the online auction communities. The proposed model addresses both the economic and technological aspects of online auction transactions by assigning a digital certificate to each participant. Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. The analytical results demonstrate that when online transactions take place with the assistance of digital certificates issued by a TTP, the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave honestly. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：273 / 286

页数：14

共 26 条

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].