PROGRESSIVE ESTATE TAXATION

被引:69
作者
Farhi, Emmanuel [1 ,2 ]
Werning, Ivan [3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
[3] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
DYNAMIC OPTIMAL TAXATION; OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION; PRIVATE INFORMATION; TAX RATES; INSURANCE; MODEL;
D O I
10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.635
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity. We derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation. First, the estate tax should be progressive, so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests. Second, marginal estate taxes should be negative, so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests. Both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests, levied separately from the income tax. These results apply to other intergenerational transfers, such as educational investments, and are robust to endogenous fertility choices. Both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation, but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages. Finally, when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative, the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level, and a progressive tax thereafter.
引用
收藏
页码:635 / 673
页数:39
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]   Dynamic optimal taxation with private information [J].
Albanesi, S ;
Sleet, C .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2006, 73 (01) :1-30
[2]   EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY IN A SIMPLE-MODEL OF EFFICIENT UNEMPLOYMENT-INSURANCE [J].
ATKESON, A ;
LUCAS, RE .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 66 (01) :64-88
[3]   ON EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTION WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION [J].
ATKESON, A ;
LUCAS, RE .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (03) :427-453
[4]   DESIGN OF TAX STRUCTURE - DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT TAXATION [J].
ATKINSON, AB ;
STIGLITZ, JE .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1976, 6 (1-2) :55-75
[5]   A REFORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC-THEORY OF FERTILITY [J].
BECKER, GS ;
BARRO, RJ .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 103 (01) :1-25
[6]   Non-linear taxation of bequests, equal sharing rules and the tradeoff between intra- and inter-family inequalities [J].
Cremer, H ;
Pestieau, P .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2001, 79 (01) :35-53
[7]   MODEL OF SOCIAL INSURANCE WITH VARIABLE RETIREMENT [J].
DIAMOND, PA ;
MIRRLEES, JA .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1978, 10 (03) :295-336
[8]  
Diamond PA, 1998, AM ECON REV, V88, P83
[9]   A REEXAMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME-TAX [J].
EBERT, U .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1992, 49 (01) :47-73
[10]  
Farhi E., 2008, POLITICAL EC NONLINE