The status of economics as a naturalistic social science

Naturalistic social science is held frequently to be the most effective means of discovering social reality (e.g., Kincaid, H. 1996. Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; McIntyre, L. 1996. Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences, Boulder, CO, Westview). This payer evaluates economics as such a science. From Kincaid (1996), criteria for naturalism in social science are identified. The focus here is whether rational, objective empirical methods exist for choosing economic theories; whether fair, cross and independent rests exist for theories, assumptions and methodological norms; and whether economic theories chosen in these ways have public policy relevance. Examples from economics are related to each of these naturalistic criteria. These encompass the relevance of econometrics to testing economic theories, the complications the non-natural-kind quality of economic variables impose on testing, and the question of whether naturalistic methods reveal economic reality. The paper concludes that the practice of economics does not, and is not able to, rely on naturalistic methods.