Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

被引:490
作者
Parrino, R [1 ]
Sias, RW
Starks, LT
机构
[1] Univ Texas, Dept Finance, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[2] Washington State Univ, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
关键词
corporate governance; institutional investors; CEO turnover;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00247-7
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate whether institutional investors "vote with their feet" when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 46
页数:44
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