Advance-purchase discounts and price discrimination in competitive markets

被引:222
作者
Dana, JD [1 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/250014
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price-taking firms may offer advance-purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance because the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance-purchase sales are made to low-valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second-degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power.
引用
收藏
页码:395 / 422
页数:28
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