Political power and the credibility of government debt

被引：22

作者：

Dixit, A ^{[1
]}

Londregan, J

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Polit Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2000年 / 94卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2000.2684

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

If political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups, then a self-selection equilibrium can arise where the government's promise to repay its debt is credible. We illustrate this using a formal model where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital. Classification Numbers: D72, E60, H63. (C) 2000 Academic Press.

引用

页码：80 / 105

页数：26

共 6 条

[1]

BIAIS B, 1997, MACHIAVELLIAN UNDERP

[2] Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics [J].