The Success of Failure: The Paradox of Performance Pay

被引:50
作者
Bowman, James S. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Florida State Univ, Askew Sch, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
[2] Florida State Univ, Askew Sch Publ Adm & Policy, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
关键词
performance pay; civil service reform; motivation; urban legend; INCENTIVES; APPRAISAL; SERVICE;
D O I
10.1177/0734371X09351824
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This normative article examines the contemporary record of pay-for-performance plans in the federal government. These programs, extending back nearly two generations, have consistently malfunctioned. Nonetheless, the state of the field today is one of continued attempts to use the technique despite agency history and research data that document its problematic nature. Based on scholarly literature, news media reports, and interview data, the analysis assesses the practical experience, policy findings, and political realities of this compensation method. The discussion raises questions about rational decision-making models and suggests that belief in performance pay is akin to an urban legend.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 88
页数:19
相关论文
共 78 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], DES EFF PAY PERF COM
  • [2] [Anonymous], 2008, Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions
  • [3] BALLENSTEDT B, 2008, LAWMAKERS SEEK REMED
  • [4] BALLENSTEDT B, 2008, GAO DEFENSE SHOULD A
  • [5] Barr S., 2007, WASH POST, pD4
  • [6] BARR S, 2007, WASHINGTON POST 1011, pD1
  • [7] Bebchuk L., 2004, PAY PERFORMANCE
  • [8] BEHN B, 2004, B BEHNS PUBLIC MANAG, V1, P102
  • [9] BEHN B, 2000, B BEHNS PUBLIC MANAG
  • [10] Berman E., 2009, Human resource management in public service paradoxes, processes, and problems