On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning

被引:56
作者
Cappelen, H [1 ]
Lepore, E
机构
[1] Vassar Coll, Dept Philosophy, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, Ctr Cognit Sci, Piscataway, NJ 08855 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-0017.00049
中图分类号
H0 [语言学];
学科分类号
030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;
摘要
A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken.
引用
收藏
页码:278 / 296
页数:19
相关论文
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