Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

被引：146

作者：

Frankel, DM ^{[1
]}

Morris, S

Pauzner, A

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

[2] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[3] Tel Aviv Univ, Eitan Berglas Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2003年 / 108卷 / 01期

关键词：

equilibrium selection; global games; strategic complementarities; supermodular games;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 44

页数：44

共 28 条

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