Status-quo management of marine recreational fisheries undermines angler welfare

被引:41
作者
Abbott, Joshua K. [1 ]
Lloyd-Smith, Patrick [2 ,3 ]
Willard, Daniel [4 ]
Adamowicz, Wiktor [5 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A8, Canada
[3] Univ Saskatchewan, Global Inst Water Secur, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A8, Canada
[4] Environm Def Fund, Oceans Program, Austin, TX 78701 USA
[5] Univ Alberta, Dept Resource Econ & Environm Sociol, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H1, Canada
关键词
recreational fisheries; management reform; rights-based management; recreational demand; GULF-OF-MEXICO; CATCH SHARES; HARVEST; FISH; RIGHTS; MODELS; 1ST;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.1809549115
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Recreational fisheries can have a significant impact on fish populations and can suffer from the same symptoms of open access as commercial fisheries. However, recreational fisheries receive little attention compared with their commercial counterparts. Regulations designed to allocate scarce fish, such as seasonal closures and bag limits, can result in significant losses of value to anglers. We provide an estimate of these foregone benefits by estimating the potential gains to implementing management reforms of the headboat portion of the recreational red snapper fishery in the US Gulf of Mexico. This fishery has suffered from a regulatory spiral of shortened seasons and lowered bag limits in spite of rebuilding stocks. We gather primary survey data of headboat anglers that elicit trip behavior and their planned number and seasonal distribution of trips under status-quo and alternative management approaches. We use these data to estimate a model of anglers' seasonal trip demand as a function of the ability to retain red snapper, bag limits, and fees. We find that a hypothetical rights-based policy, whereby vessels with secure rights to a portion of annual catch could offer their customers year-round fishing in exchange for lower per-angler retention and increased fees, could raise the average angler's welfare by $139/y. When placed in the global context of recreational fishing, these estimates suggest that status-quo management may deprive anglers of billions of dollars of lost economic value per year.
引用
收藏
页码:8948 / 8953
页数:6
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