Does the Frequency of Pay-for-Performance Payment Matter?-Experience from a Randomized Trial

被引：20

作者：

Chung, Sukyung ^{[1
]}

Palaniappan, Latha ^{[1
]}

Wong, Eric ^{[1
]}

Rubin, Haya ^{[2
]}

Luft, Harold ^{[1
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Palo Alto Med Fdn, Res Inst, Palo Alto, CA 94301 USA

[2] Res & Evaluat, Palo Alto, CA USA

[3] Univ Calif San Francisco, Philip R Lee Inst Hlth Policy Studies, San Francisco, CA USA

来源：

HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH | 2010年 / 45卷 / 02期

基金：

美国医疗保健研究与质量局;

关键词：

Pay-for-performance; quality of care; primary care practice; physician incentives; randomized trial; PHYSICIAN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; MEDICAID MANAGED CARE; PREVENTIVE CARE; QUALITY; FEEDBACK; REGISTRY; IMPROVE; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01072.x

中图分类号：

R19 [保健组织与事业（卫生事业管理）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

Objective To examine the effects of incentive payment frequency on quality measures in a physician-specific pay-for-performance (P4P) experiment. Study Setting A multispecialty physician group practice. Study Design In 2007, all primary care physicians (n=179) were randomized into two study arms differing by the frequency of incentive payment, either four quarterly bonus checks or a single year-end bonus (maximum of U.S.$5,000/year for both arms). Data Collection/Extraction Methods Data were extracted from electronic health records. Quality measure scores between the two arms over four quarters were compared. Principal Findings There was no difference between the two arms in average quality measure score or in total bonus amount earned. Conclusions Physicians' responses to a P4P program with a small maximum bonus do not differ by frequency of bonus payment.

引用

页码：553 / 564

页数：12

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