Efficiency-Risk Tradeoffs in Electricity Markets with Dynamic Demand Response

被引:26
作者
Huang, Qingqing [1 ]
Roozbehani, Mardavij [2 ]
Dahleh, Munther A. [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] MIT, Dept Lab Informat & Decis Syst, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
Power demand; power industry; smart grids; supply and demand; CONSUMPTION; GRIDS;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2014.2326614
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
080906 [电磁信息功能材料与结构]; 082806 [农业信息与电气工程];
摘要
In order to study the impact of dynamic demand response in the future smart grid, we examine in an abstract framework how a tradeoff between efficiency and risk arises under different market architectures. We first examine the system performance under noncooperative and cooperative market architectures. The statistics of the stationary aggregate demand processes show that, although the noncooperative load scheduling scheme leads to an efficiency loss, the stationary distribution of the corresponding aggregate demand process has a smaller tail, resulting in less frequent aggregate demand spikes. Cooperative dynamic demand response, on the other hand, makes the market place more efficient at the cost of increased risk of aggregate demand spikes. The market architecture determines the locus of the system performance with respect to the tradeoff curve. We also investigate how a properly designed real-time electricity pricing mechanism can help the system operator achieve a target tradeoff between efficiency and risk in a noncooperative market. We further provide a convex characterization of the Pareto front of system performance measures, which serves as a benchmark of the tradeoffs for the system operator to evaluate the pricing rules.
引用
收藏
页码:279 / 290
页数:12
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