A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money

被引：45

作者：

Coles, MG ^{[1
]}

Wright, R

机构：

[1] Univ Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, Essex, England

[2] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Barcelona, Spain

[3] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 78卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1997.2353

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：32 / 54

页数：23

共 34 条

[1] SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES
AZARIADIS, C
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 25 (03) : 380 - 396
[2] THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING
BINMORE, K
RUBINSTEIN, A
WOLINSKY, A
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 17 (02) : 176 - 188
[3] Binmore K., 1987, EC BARGAINING
[4] A DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF SEARCH, PRODUCTION, AND EXCHANGE
BOLDRIN, M
KIYOTAKI, N
WRIGHT, R
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 1993, 17 (5-6) : 723 - 758
[5] CAMERA G, 1996, UNPUB MONETARY PATTE
[6] Christopher A., 1994, Economic theory, P381
[7] COLES MG, 1995, BARGAINING INVENTORI
[8] RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS BUSINESS CYCLES IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM
DIAMOND, P
FUDENBERG, D
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (03) : 606 - 619
[9] DRAZEN A, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P369
[10] GREEN EJ, 1996, UNPUB RUDIMENTARY MO

← 1 2 3 4 →