Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions

被引：14

作者：

Dekel, E ^{[1
]}

Wolinsky, A

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Berglass Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2003年 / 43卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

common knowledge of rationality; rationalizability; large auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00016-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider discrete versions of first-price auctions. We present a condition on beliefs about players' values such that, with any fixed finite set of possible bids and sufficiently many players, only bidding the bid closest from below to one's true value survives iterative deletion of bids that are dominated, where the dominance is evaluated using beliefs that satisfy the condition. The condition holds in an asymmetric conditionally independent environment so long as the likelihood of each type is bounded from below. In particular, with many players, common knowledge of rationality and that all types are possible in an independent and private values auction implies that players will bid just below their true value. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：175 / 188

页数：14