Are food safety standards different from other food standards? A political economy perspective

被引:23
作者
Swinnen, Johan F. M. [1 ]
Vandemoortele, Thijs [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leuven KUL, Dept Econ, LICOS Ctr Inst & Econ Performance, Louvain, Belgium
基金
比利时弗兰德研究基金会;
关键词
food standards; food safety; political economy; D72; I18; L51; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; WARRANTIES; PROTECTION; ISSUES; EXPERT; LEMONS; TRADE; RISK;
D O I
10.1093/erae/jbp025
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
This paper uses a political economy model which integrates risk to analyse whether the nature of public food standards [food safety standards, food quality standards, and social and environmental standards] affects the politically optimal level of the standard and the likelihood of trade conflicts. In general, public food safety standards are set at higher levels because stronger consumption effects translate into larger political incentives for governments. The relationship between food standards and protectionism is also affected by the nature of the standards.
引用
收藏
页码:507 / 523
页数:17
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