Natural and artifactual kinds: Are children realists or relativists about categories?

被引:31
作者
Kalish, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Educ Psychol, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1037/0012-1649.34.2.376
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
Research in cognitive development has highlighted important differences between conceptions of natural kinds and artifacts. One interpretation of the distinction is that natural kinds are categories one discovers, whereas artifactual kinds are invented. Four studies assessed whether children and adults saw categorization decisions as objective matters of fact or as invented conventions. Preschool age children treated basic-level categories of animals and human-made artifacts as objective. At the superordinate level, kinds of animals were treated as more objective than were kinds of artifacts. In general, adults' judgments were similar to children's. Both children and adults have reliable and differentiated intuitions regarding category objectivity. The results from these studies are discussed in terms of their implications for structural and theory-based accounts of category naturalness.
引用
收藏
页码:376 / 391
页数:16
相关论文
共 45 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], DEV THEORIES MIND
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1967, The Philosophy of the inductive sciences: Part Two
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1932, MORAL DEV CHILD
[4]  
ATRAN S, 1987, NAOM CHOMSKY CONSENS, P247
[5]  
Brown Roger., 1965, SOC PSYCHOL-GERMANY
[6]  
DUPRE J, 1981, PHILOS REV, V90, P66, DOI 10.2307/2184373
[7]  
Flavell J.H., 1988, DEV THEORIES MIND, P244
[8]  
Fodor J.A., 1975, The language of thought
[9]  
Forguson L., 1988, Developing theories of mind, P226
[10]  
Gelman S.A., 1991, PERSPECTIVES LANGUAG, P146, DOI DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511983689.006