The Impact of Dual Class Structure on Earnings Management Activities

被引:41
作者
Nguyen, Van Thuan [2 ]
Xu, Li [1 ]
机构
[1] So Illinois Univ, Sch Accountancy, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA
[2] Morgan State Univ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Baltimore, MD USA
关键词
dual class; earnings management; agency cost; ownership structure; voting rights; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; ACCOUNTING CHOICES; STOCK; LITIGATION; DECREASES; RIGHTS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02203.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms with dual class structure are less likely to engage in earnings management activities than firms with single class structure. The paper also finds that within the sample of firms with dual class structure, earnings management activities are positively associated with managerial cash flow rights, but marginally and negatively associated with managerial voting rights. In addition, the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights has a marginally negative impact on earnings management. Finally, in a sample of firms switching from dual class structure to single class structure, earnings management activities increase following the switch.
引用
收藏
页码:456 / 485
页数:30
相关论文
共 48 条