Signaling in venture capitalist - New venture team funding decisions: Does it indicate long-term venture outcomes?

被引:253
作者
Busenitz, LW [1 ]
Fiet, JO
Moesel, DD
机构
[1] Univ Oklahoma, Price Coll Business, Dept Management, Norman, OK 73019 USA
[2] Univ Louisville, Coll Business & Publ Adm, Louisville, KY 40292 USA
[3] Univ Missouri, Dept Management, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6520.2005.00066.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
According to signaling theory, new venture teams (NVTs) can communicate to venture capitalists and other potential investors both a "value" signal and a "commitment" signal, based on the level of personal investment in a venture. Venture capitalists (VCs) typically want to know if a NVT is really committed to a venture and if its members truly believe that a venture has wealth creating potential. Team members can convey signals via their investment behavior. We test our hypotheses based on a sample of 183 VC-backed ventures that we tracked over a ten-year time period. These data indicate that the signals sent to VCs in the early stages of the funding process do not appear to have any significant relationship with long-term venture outcomes. We explore possible explanations for these findings, as well as their implications for signaling theory and future research.
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页码:1 / 12
页数:12
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