Patents as collateral

被引：60

作者：

Amable, Bruno ^{[2
]}

Chatelain, Jean-Bernard ^{[2
]}

Ralf, Kirsten ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ESCE, F-92916 Paris, France

[2] Univ Paris 01, Paris Sch Econ, CES, F-75647 Paris 13, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2010年 / 34卷 / 06期

关键词：

Collateral; Patents; Research and development; Credit rationing; Growth; Innovation; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS; MONETARY-POLICY; CREDIT; CONSTRAINTS; PROTECTION; LIQUIDITY; GROWTH; PRICES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1092 / 1104

页数：13

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