Discretionary Revenues as a Measure of Earnings Management

被引:228
作者
Stubben, Stephen R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA
关键词
revenues; earnings management; discretionary accruals; ACCRUALS; MANIPULATION; INCENTIVES; QUALITY;
D O I
10.2308/accr.2010.85.2.695
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect simulated and actual earnings management. The results indicate that revenue models are less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. Using a simulation procedure, I find that revenue models are more likely than accrual models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Using a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense-related misstatements, I find that, although revenue models detect manipulation, accrual models do not. These findings provide support for using measures of discretionary revenues to study earnings management.
引用
收藏
页码:695 / 717
页数:23
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