An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information

被引:28
作者
Çelen, B
Kariv, S
机构
[1] Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] NYU, New York, NY USA
关键词
asymmetric information; herd behavior; informational cascades; imperfect information; experimental economics;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-004-0542-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Nearly all observational learning models assume that individuals can observe all the decisions that have previously been made. In reality, such perfect information is rarely available. To explore the difference between observational learning under perfect and imperfect information, this paper takes an experimental look at a situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of their immediate predecessors. Our experimental design uses the procedures of Celen and Kariv [9] and is based on the theory of Celen and Kariv [10]. We find that imitation is much less frequent when subjects have imperfect information, even less frequent than the theory predicts. Further, while we find strong evidence that under perfect information a form of generalized Bayesian behavior adequately explains behavior in the laboratory, under imperfect information behavior is not consistent even with this generalization of Bayesian behavior.
引用
收藏
页码:677 / 699
页数:23
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