Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance

被引:54
作者
Ferris, Stephen P. [1 ]
Yan, Xuemin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Coll Business, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
mutual funds; governance; board of directors; fund fees; fund scandals;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2006.12.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Recent scandals involving late trading, market timing, and other trading abuses have prompted the SEC to propose changes in the governance of mutual funds. Among these changes are the requirements for an independent chairman and a board consisting of at least 75% independent directors. Using a large sample of mutual fund families for 2002, we find that neither the probability of a fund scandal nor overall fund performance is related to either chair or board independence. Overall, our results question the usefulness of these recently proposed SEC changes in mutual fund governance. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:392 / 420
页数:29
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