On the profitability of production perturbations in a dynamic natural resource oligopoly

被引:10
作者
Benchekroun, H
Gaudet, G
机构
[1] Univ Montreal, Dept Sci Econ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
[2] Univ Montreal, Ctr Rech & Dev Econ, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
[3] Florida Atlantic Univ, Dept Econ, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
关键词
production perturbations; dynamic oligopoly; differential games; nonrenewable resources;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00023-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be forced to marginally contract its production, its profits would fall. On the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously forced to reduce their production, thus moving the industry towards monopoly output, each firm's profit would rise. We show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly, such as a nonrenewable natural resource oligopoly, where the exogenous constraint would take the form of a contraction of the firm's output path over some fixed interval of time: there are situations where a firm will gain from being the lone firm constrained in this way and cases where each firm will lose if all the firms in the industry are so constrained, thus exactly reversing the conclusions obtained from purely static analysis. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1237 / 1252
页数:16
相关论文
共 4 条
[1]  
Basar T., 1999, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, V23
[2]   MULTIMARKET OLIGOPOLY - STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS [J].
BULOW, JI ;
GEANAKOPLOS, JD ;
KLEMPERER, PD .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (03) :488-511
[3]  
Fudenberg Drew, 1991, Game Theory
[4]  
GAUDET G, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P658