Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

被引:433
作者
Fehr, E
Rockenbach, B
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Res Econ, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ Erfurt, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany
关键词
D O I
10.1038/nature01474
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour-unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters-in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 140
页数:4
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