Early retirement

被引：36

作者：

Conde-Ruiz, JI

Galasso, V

机构：

[1] Univ Bocconi, Ist Econ Polit, I-20136 Milan, Italy

[2] FEDEA, Madrid 28001, Spain

[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ, Barcelona 08005, Spain

[4] IGIER, Milan, Italy

[5] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Madrid, Spain

[6] CEPR, London, England

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2003年 / 6卷 / 01期

关键词：

social security; policy persistence; structure-induced equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1016/S1094-2025(02)00018-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Generous early retirement provisions account for a large proportion of the drop in the labor force participation of elderly workers. The aim of this paper is to provide a positive theory of early retirement. We suggest that the political support for generous early retirement provisions relies on: (i) the existence of a significant group of elderly workers with incomplete working history, who are not entitled to an old age pension; and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution built in this provision via the utility from leisure that induces low-ability workers to retire early. The majority which supports early retirement in a bidimensional voting game is composed of elderly with incomplete working history and low-ability workers; social security is supported by retirees and low-ability workers. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：12 / 36

页数：25

共 27 条

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