Currency value moderates equity preference among young children

被引:223
作者
Blake, Peter R. [1 ]
Rand, David G. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Berkman Ctr Internet & Soc, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
Cooperation; Dictator game; Development; Children; ANONYMOUS ECONOMIC GAME; VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; GROUP SELECTION; SOCIAL NORMS; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; ALTRUISM; BEHAVIOR; FAIRNESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.06.012
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
010107 [宗教学];
摘要
Cooperative behavior depends in part on a preference for equitable outcomes. Recent research in behavioral economics assesses variables that influence adult concerns for equity, but few studies to date investigate the emergence of equitable behavior in children using similar economic games. We tested 288 3- to 6-year olds in an anonymous Dictator Game to assess how the value of the currency used affects equity preferences in children. To manipulate value, children played the game with their most or least favorite stickers. At all ages, we found a strong value effect with children donating more of their least favorite stickers than their favorite stickers. We also found a dramatic increase with age in the percentage of children who were prosocial (i.e. donated at least one sticker). However, children who were prosocial tended to give the same proportion of stickers at all ages about half of their least favorite stickers and 40% of their favorite stickers. These findings highlight the influence of resource value on children's preference for equity, and provide evidence for two different processes underlying altruistic giving: the decision to donate at all and the decision about how much to donate. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:210 / 218
页数:9
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