Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given

被引:14
作者
Tang, Refeng [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Social Sci, Inst Philosophy, Beijing 100732, Peoples R China
[2] UCL, Dept Philosophy, London WC1E 6BT, England
关键词
Conceptualism; Nondoxasticism; The propositional criterion of justification; The doxastic criterion of justification; Two senses of the Given; The New Myth of the Given; PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE; DAVIDSON; DONALD; KNOWLEDGE; MCDOWELL; SELLARS; BELIEF;
D O I
10.1007/s11229-009-9529-5
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
The motivation for McDowell's conceptualism is an epistemological consideration. McDowell believes conceptualism would guarantee experience a justificatory role in our belief system and we can then avoid the Myth of the Given without falling into coherentism. Conceptualism thus claims an epistemological advantage over nonconceptualism. The epistemological advantage of conceptualism is not to be denied. But both Sellars and McDowell insist experience is not belief. This makes it impossible for experience to justify empirical knowledge, for the simple reason that what is not a belief cannot justify a belief. Nondoxastic experience, though conceptual, is still a Given. And what conceptualism gives us can only be a New Myth of the Given.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 122
页数:22
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