Economic voting:: The effect of political context, volatility and turnout on voters' assignment of responsibility

被引:63
作者
Bengtsson, Å [1 ]
机构
[1] Abo Akad Univ, Dept Polit Sci, FIN-20500 Turku, Finland
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.0304-4130.2004.00173.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This study analyses macroeconomic conditions and the electoral fortune of incumbents in 21 parliamentary Western countries between 1950 and 1997 in 266 national elections. Voters' assignment of responsibility for the state of the national economy is assumed to vary according to the context of the election. Building on previous research, the importance of the political context - clarity of responsibility and availability of alternatives - is analysed. The study also breaks new ground by introducing two new contexts of importance: volatility, seen from a systemic perspective, and the trend in turnout. The contextual hypothesis is confirmed. The universal economic effect as such is very weak indeed. However, given a favourable political and institutional environment (clear responsibility structure and availability of alternatives), an economic effect appears. Tests including the new contexts created on the basis of behavioural patterns in the electorate (system volatility and turnout trend) identify elections where the economic effects are even stronger.
引用
收藏
页码:749 / 767
页数:19
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