Shareholder wealth effects of the private securities litigation reform act of 1995

被引：6

作者：

Johnson M.F. ^{[1
]}

Kasznik R.O.N. ^{[2
]}

Nelson K.K. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Eli Broad College of Business, East Lansing

[2] Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford

来源：

Review of Accounting Studies | 2000年 / 5卷 / 3期

关键词：

Litigation risk; Regulatory event study; Securities litigation;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1009612610389

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper investigates the reaction of stock prices to enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Based on a sample of 489 high-technology firms, we find that the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average, and that the market reaction is more positive for firms at greatest risk of being sued in a securities class action. However, we also show that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms likely to be the subject of a meritorious lawsuit. Collectively, our evidence implies that shareholders generally benefit from restrictions on private securities litigation, although these benefits are mitigated when other mechanisms for curbing fraudulent activity are inadequate. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：217 / 233

页数：16

共 34 条

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