Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow

被引:11
作者
Herbert A. Simon
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon University,Department of Psychology
关键词
rationality; economic; rationality; psychological; rationality; bounded; rationality under uncertainty; utility theory; decision theory; scientific discovery; game theory;
D O I
10.1007/BF02512227
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available for conducting empirical inquiry and constructing models be incorporated in social science graduate education.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 39
页数:14
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