Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market

被引：1

作者：

Romero-Medina A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Departament of Economics, University of California, Riverside

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 1998年 / 3卷 / 2期

关键词：

Implementation; Matching markets;

D O I：

10.1007/s100580050009

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of "non-reverse" preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences. © Springer-Verlag 1998.

引用

页码：137 / 147

页数：10

共 9 条

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[7] Roth, A.E., The college Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem (1985) J. Econ. Theory, 36, pp. 277-288
[8] Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M., The College Admissions Problem Revised (1989) Econometrica, 57, pp. 559-570
[9] Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M., (1990) Two-Sided Matching Markets: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, , Econometric Society Monograph. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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