Coordination of purchasing and bidding activities across posted offer and auction markets

被引:3
作者
Zeng D.D. [1 ]
Cox J.C. [2 ]
Dror M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of MIS, Eller College of Management, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ
[2] Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA
关键词
Equilibrium bidding; Fixed transaction costs; Multiple markets; Online auctions;
D O I
10.1007/s10257-006-0037-6
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In both consumer purchasing and industrial procurement, combinatorial interdependencies among the items to be purchased are commonplace. E-commerce compounds the problem by providing more opportunities for switching suppliers at low costs, but also potentially eases the problem by enabling automated market decision-making systems, commonly referred to as trading agents, to make purchasing decisions in an integrated manner across markets. We are investigating a new approach to deal with the combinatorial interdependency challenges for online markets. This approach relies on existing commercial online market institutions such as posted-offer markets and various online auctions that sell single items. It uses trading agents to coordinate a buyer's purchasing and bidding activities across multiple online markets simultaneously to achieve the best overall procurement effectiveness. This paper presents two sets of models related to this approach. The first set of models formalizes optimal purchasing decisions across posted-offer markets with fixed transaction costs. The second set of models is concerned with the coordination of bidding activities across multiple online auctions. © Springer-Verlag 2006.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 46
页数:21
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