On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

被引：12

作者：

Daniel Friedman

机构：

[1] Department of Economics,

[2] University of California at Santa Cruz,undefined

[3] 212 Social Sciences I,undefined

[4] Santa Cruz,undefined

[5] CA 95064,undefined

[6] USA,undefined

来源：

Journal of Evolutionary Economics | 1998年 / 8卷

关键词：

Key words: Evolutionary games; Adjustment dynamics; ESS; Evolutionary equilibrium; JEL-classification: B25; C62; C72; C73;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.

引用

页码：15 / 43

页数：28