Ethics for things

被引：13

作者：

Adam A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] University of Salford, Salford

来源：

Ethics and Information Technology | 2008年 / 10卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

Actor-network theory; Distributed morality; Information ethics; Intentionality;

D O I：

10.1007/s10676-008-9169-3

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper considers the ways that Information Ethics (IE) treats things. A number of critics have focused on IE's move away from anthropocentrism to include non-humans on an equal basis in moral thinking. I enlist Actor Network Theory, Dennett's views on 'as if' intentionality and Magnani's characterization of 'moral mediators'. Although they demonstrate different philosophical pedigrees, I argue that these three theories can be pressed into service in defence of IE 's treatment of things. Indeed the support they lend to the extension of moral status to non-human objects can be seen as part of a trend towards the accommodation of non-humans into our moral and social networks. A number of parallels are drawn between philosophical arguments over artificial intelligence and information ethics. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008.

引用

页码：149 / 154

页数：5

共 22 条

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[2]

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[3]

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[9]

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[10]

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