Multiproject team assignments

被引:1
作者
Sherstyuk K. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville
关键词
Allocation problem; Incentive mechanisms; Monotonicity; Teams;
D O I
10.1007/s100580050036
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. © Springer-Verlag 1999.
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页码:231 / 254
页数:23
相关论文
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