Managerial disclosures and shareholder litigation

被引：8

作者：

Trueman B. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

来源：

Review of Accounting Studies | 1997年 / 2卷 / 2期

关键词：

Public Finance; Good News; Security Exchange; Prospective Information; Unfavorable Information;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1018303309137

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper explores the link between shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and managerial disclosures of prospective information. When the manager's information is such that there is no affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, previous research has shown that the manager will withhold his information if it is sufficiently unfavorable and will disclose it otherwise. When the manager's information is such that there exists an affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, it is shown here that the manager will release either good news or news that is sufficiently bad. Further, the good news disclosures are expected to be more precise than those that reflect unfavorable information. It is also demonstrated that the probability of a disclosure will increase with both the precision of the manager's information and the variability of his firm's earnings. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：181 / 199

页数：18

共 14 条

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