Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

被引:7
作者
Martin Peitz
机构
[1] International University in Germany,
来源
Journal of Regulatory Economics | 2005年 / 28卷
关键词
access price; entry; interconnection charge; regulation; telecommunications; termination-based price discrimination; L96; L51; L13;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally.
引用
收藏
页码:327 / 343
页数:16
相关论文
共 28 条
[1]  
Armstrong M.(1998)“Network Interconnection in Telecommunications” Economic Journal 108 545-564
[2]  
Armstrong M.(2004)“Network Interconnection with Asymmetric Networks and Heterogeneous Calling Patterns” Information Economics and Policy 16 375-390
[3]  
Cambini C.(2003)“Network Competition with Price Discrimination: ‘Bill-and-Keep’ Is not so Bad after All” Economics Letters 81 205-213
[4]  
Valletti T.(1999)“Interconnection in Network Industries” Review of Industrial Organization 14 1-25
[5]  
Carter M.(2003)“Asymmetric Network Interconnection” Review of Industrial Organization 22 27-46
[6]  
Wright J.(2002a)“New Competition in Telecommunications Markets: Regulatory Pricing Principles” Ifo-Studien 48 27-52
[7]  
Carter M.(2004)“Dynamic Regulation and Competition in Telecommunications Markets—A Policy Framework” Information Economics and Policy 16 411-437
[8]  
Wright J.(2001)“Using ‘Bill-and-Keep’ Interconnection Arrangements to Soften Network Competition” Economics Letters 71 413-420
[9]  
De Bijl P.(1998a)“Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing” Rand Journal of Economics 29 1-37
[10]  
Peitz M.(1998b)“Network Competition: II.Price Discrimination” Rand Journal of Economics 29 38-56