Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination

被引:12
作者
Andreas Ortmann
John Fitzgerald
Carl Boeing
机构
[1] Max Planck Institute for Human Development,Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition
[2] Bowdoin College,Department of Economics
关键词
experimental economics; trust; reciprocity; information presentation; prompting strategic reasoning; experimental design; experimental implementation;
D O I
10.1023/A:1009946125005
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122–142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. They find significant amounts of trust and reciprocity and conclude that trust is a guiding behavioral instinct (a “primitive” in their terminology). We modify the way information is presented to participants and, through a questionnaire, prompt strategic reasoning. To our surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount invested. Previously reported experimental results to the contrary did not survive replication. Our results suggest that those by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe are rather robust to changes in information presentation and strategic reasoning prompts. We discuss the implications of these findings.
引用
收藏
页码:81 / 100
页数:19
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