Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties

被引：4

作者：

Eyckmans J. ^{[1
,2
]}

Finus M. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] EHSAL, Europese Hogeschool Brussel, 1000 Brussels

[2] Centrum voor Economische Studiën, K.U. Leuven, Leuven

[3] Department of Economics, University of Hagen, 58084 Hagen

来源：

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics | 2007年 / 7卷 / 1期

关键词：

Coalition formation; Design of climate treaty protocol; Integrated assessment model; Non-cooperative game theory;

D O I：

10.1007/s10784-006-9030-2

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We analyze important forces that hamper the formation of successful self-enforcing agreements to mitigate global warming from an economic point of view. The analysis combines two modules: (a) an integrated assessment model that captures the feedback between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system and (b) a game theoretic model that determines stable coalitions in the presence of free-riding incentives. We consider two types of measures to enhance the success of international environmental treaty-making: (a) transfers, aiming at balancing asymmetric gains from cooperation; (b) institutional changes, aiming at making it more difficult to upset stability of a treaty. We find that institutional changes may be as important as transfers and should therefore receive more attention in future international negotiations. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007.

引用

页码：73 / 97

页数：24

共 40 条

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