Revisiting individual evolutionary learning in the cobweb model - An illustration of the virtual spite-effect

被引：20

作者：

Arifovic J. ^{[1
]}

Maschek M.K. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6

来源：

Computational Economics | 2006年 / 28卷 / 4期

关键词：

Individual learning; Robustness; Social learning; Spite effect;

D O I：

10.1007/s10614-006-9053-3

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We examine the Cournot oligopoly model in the. context of social and individual learning. In both models of learning, firms update their decisions about how much to produce via variants of the genetic algorithm updating procedure. Arifovic (1994) found that both models of social and individual learning converged to the Walrasian, competitive equilibrium. Vriend (2000) reports that the model of social learning converges to the Walrasian equilibrium outcome, while the model of individual learning converges to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We revisit the issue and conduct simulations varying elements of the updating algorithms, as well as of the underlying economic model. In the analysis of the outcomes of our simulations, we conclude that the convergence to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is due to two things: the specific way in which production rules' performance is evaluated coupled with a specific cost function specification. © Springer 2006.

引用

页码：333 / 354

页数：21

共 13 条

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