The impact of physician payment methods on raising the efficiency of the healthcare system: An international comparison

被引:17
作者
Simoens S. [1 ,3 ]
Giuffrida A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven
[2] Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC
[3] Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 3000 Leuven
关键词
Primary Care Physician; Specialist Physician; Payment Method; Capitation Payment; Physician Workforce;
D O I
10.2165/00148365-200403010-00008
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This article reviews policies on physician payment methods that Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have implemented to promote an efficient deployment of physicians. Countries' experiences show that payment by fee-for-service, capitation and salary influences physician activity levels and productivity. However, the impact of these simple payment methods is complex and may be diluted by clinical, demographic, ethical and organisational factors. Policies that have attempted to curb health expenditure by controlling fee levels have sometimes been eroded by physicians increasing the volume of service supply, or providing services that attract higher fees. Flexible blended payment methods based on the combination of a fixed component, through either capitation or salary, and a variable component, through fee-for-service, may produce a desirable mix of incentives. Integrating such blended payment methods with mechanisms to monitor physician activity may offer potential success. © 2004 Adis Data Information BV. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 46
页数:7
相关论文
共 37 条
[1]  
Health at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2003, (2003)
[2]  
Gosden T., Pederson L., Torgerson D., How should we pay doctors? A systematic review of salary payments and their effect on doctor behaviour, QJ Med, 92, pp. 47-55, (1999)
[3]  
Gosden T., Forland F., Kristiansen I.S., Et al., Impact of payment method on behaviour of primary care physicians: A systematic review, J Health Serv Res Policy, 6, pp. 44-55, (2001)
[4]  
Robinson J.C., Theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives, Milbank Mem Fund Q, 79, pp. 149-177, (2001)
[5]  
Hausman D., LeGrand J., Incentives and health policy: Primary and secondary care in the British National Health Service, Soc Sci Med, 49, pp. 1299-1307, (1999)
[6]  
Gravelle H., Capitation contracts: Access and quality, J Health Econ, 18, pp. 315-340, (1999)
[7]  
Gravelle H., Masiero G., Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: Capitation in general practice, J Health Econ, 19, pp. 1067-1088, (2000)
[8]  
Grytten J., Sorensen R., Type of contract and supplier-induced demand for primary physicians in Norway, J Health Econ, 20, pp. 379-393, (2001)
[9]  
Cumming J., Mays N., Shifting to capitation in primary care: What might the impact be in New Zealand?, Aust Health Rev, 22, pp. 8-24, (1999)
[10]  
Hutchison B., Abelson J., Lavis J., Primary care in Canada: So much innovation, so little change, Health Aff, 20, pp. 116-131, (2001)