Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability?

被引：5

作者：

Claude Meidinger

Jean-Louis Rullière

Marie-Claire Villeval

机构：

[1] TEAM, CNRS, University Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne, 75013 Paris

[2] GATE, CNRS, University Lumiere Lyon 2, 69130 Ecully

来源：

Experimental Economics | 2003年 / 6卷 / 3期

关键词：

Compensation; Experiments; Free riding; Peer pressure; Teamwork;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1026221318302

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team heterogeneity in terms of productivity influences both the revenue sharing proposed by the principal to the team and the employees' performance. Experimental evidence shows that when the team is heterogeneous, the principal does not try to motivate the agents through her sharing offer. Regardless of the level of team-based compensation, a large amount of free riding occurs since each agent is mainly influenced by his teammate's behavior. In contrast, when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to cooperate, reciprocating the principal's offer.

引用

页码：253 / 272

页数：19

共 31 条

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